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Non-technical Summary
The number of decision makers in the Governing Council of the ECB increases sig-
nificantly when new EU members join the European Monetary Union. Therefore,
a reform is necessary to ensure the efficiency of the decision-making processes. The
agreed reform proposal of the ECB is evaluated using different classification crite-
ria to group the governors for asymmetric rotation and the assignment of voting
power instead of voting weights to determine the influence the governors of different
rotation groups would have on interest rate decisions.
With a growing number of members in the ECB Council, the processes to decide
about the interest will be more complex and take considerably more time if the
decision-making process is the same as in the status quo. Furthermore, the difference
between the economic and political weight will increase. Therefore, the ECB will
switch to a rotation scheme if the number of members grows. E.g., if the number of
central bank governors would be 25, three groups of governors are formed, where the
first group of five members gets four votes, the second 13 members have eight votes
and three votes are assigned to the third group of seven governors. Independently of
the number of central bank governors in the Council, only 15 governors have voting
rights. The members of the board have one vote as hitherto and the president
decides in case of a tie.
The rotation scheme is assessed, first, using different economic criteria for the clas-
sification of the governors into the different groups and, second, determining the
voting power of the Council members using voting power indices, especially the
Banzhaf measure and the Banzhaf index.
We analyse how the composition of the three groups changes if not the index of the
reform proposal is used but different economic criteria are applied. One possibility
would be the synchronisation of the economic development of the countries. The
more similar the economic development the more equal are the needs of the countries
with regard to monetary policy. The economic development is described by an
index calculated as the unweighed average of the inflation rate and the deviation of
industrial production from its trend. It is shown that the grouping in terms of the
correlation of the country-specific index with the average of the respective monetary
union does not lead to a much different situation regarding the allocation of voting
rights. Countries with lower economic weight like Austria or Belgium would gain
a higher voting weight. But the new member states are mainly allocated into the
third group as before.
A second possibility to assess the reform is to calculate the voting power and com-
pare it with the population and economic weight of a country. The voting power
reflects the influence a governor can exert on the outcome of a vote on the change
of the interest rate. For the determination of voting power different indices are used
(Shapley-Shubik index, Banzhaf measure, Banzhaf index). Different scenarios are
imaginable. One crucial assumption concerns the behaviour of the board. If the
board members support the national central bank governors in the votes on the
interest rate, the board members behave as national partisans. The voting power
suggests that the influence of a board member declines with the enlargement of the
Council but rises with the introduction of rotation. The indices of voting power
show that the influence could well be higher than in the status quo.
For the national central bank governors, the intertemporal voting weight unveils the
same pattern as the voting power indices for most of the time. The evaluation of the
classification into three groups shows an adjustment of the economic and political
weight in the group three of small countries and in the second group. The first
group gains a small amount of political weight with the introduction of the rotation
scheme after a loss by the enlarged committee.
As the analysis shows, the use of different economic criteria does not lead to a
reversed ordering of the countries and, therefore, to a much different allocation of the
governors to the groups compared to the arranged classification scheme. The use of
the deviation from the average economic situation would lead to more changes in the
group composition than the use of the synchronisation of the economic development.
But even then, most of the countries would move into the next higher or lower group.
A change from the first to the third group or reverse would be a rare exception. The
assessment with regard to the voting power of the Council members depends on
the assumption about the behaviour of the board members. With the rotation
scheme, the difference between economic and political weight is not much reduced
as the comparison of voting power indices in the status quo and an enlarged decision-
making body shows.
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monetary union in the ECB Council. The reform is assessed by analysing
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1 Introduction
The enlargement of the European Union (EU) by ten members in 2004 and the out-
look for a later expansion of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the possible
joining of Denmark, Sweden and UK to the EMU made a reform of the decision-
making body of the European Central Bank (ECB) acute. The reform proposal of
the ECB has been accepted by the Council. The reform provides a rotation of voting
rights in different groups of national central bank governors. The board is excluded
from rotation. In this paper, we evaluate the reform extensively. First, we analyse
the group composition if other than the declared criteria are applied. Second, we
look at the difference between the economic and political weight of the countries
using voting power indices besides the intertemporal voting share.
The discussion about the reform of the Governing Council of the ECB shows two
starting points with regard to the assumptions about the independence of the mon-
etary policy of the ECB:
a) The first point of view is that the members of the Governing Council of the ECB
decide on the basis of the economic situation of the euro area as laid down in
the statute (Article 108 of the Maastricht Treaty). Then, from an economists’
point of view, there is no difference between the status quo and a committee
composed of experts which conduct monetary policy for the euro area. Surely,
the same economic figures can be interpreted differently by the decision-makers
but the dissent should not be too large and an agreement possible. If this
description is correct, a reduction of the members of the Governing Council
should not be objected by the member states.
b) The second approach is that the country of origin of the Council members mat-
ters and the asymmetries in the economic situation and development between
the member states can distort the decisions regarding the interest rate. In this
case, a governor is not only a distinguished expert with respect to monetary
policy but also a representative of its country of origin. Then, another solution
to the problem of efficient decision-making in the Governing Council with a
growing number of members is necessary. Here, the selection of members who
are allowed to vote seems crucial for the results of monetary policy.
In addition to the conditions of efficient decision-making with a large number of
decision makers, the representation of the member states is a crucial question. Even
if the national central bank governors base their decision on the average euro area
situation the question of representation arises. To enhance the approval of central
bank decisions by the people of the member states there should be no suspicion
with respect to the ECB members pursuing national interest or deciding because of
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political influence of big or small member states. This is important because legiti-
macy still arises via the member states (Heisenberg 2003). This does not necessarily
imply that the representatives pursue national interests but that the Council mem-
bers represent their country of origin from the view of the citizens. Therefore, there
is a trade off between democratic legitimacy and efficient decision-making in the
process of denationalisation of voting rights. For Heisenberg (2003) the process
of decision-making, especially transparency, secures legitimacy. The legitimacy of
denationalisation will be possible if transparency is high enough.
The question of power in the decision-making of the EU within the Commission
or the Council of Ministers has attracted far more attention than the power of
decision-making in the ECB Council. Previous studies on the subject of the reform
of the ECB concentrate either on the analysis of voting weights in the ECB Council1
or on the EMU with 11 (EMU-11), 12 (EMU-15) or 15 (EMU-15) member states
(Mangano 1999, Brueckner 2001). Fahrholz and Mohl (2004) compare different
rotation scenarios with the help of a voting power analysis for the EMU-25. Another
source is Bindseil (2001) combining the assessment of voting power with a prediction
about potential transfers by monetary policy. Rents from economic integration are
distributed according to voting rights. If the number of countries grows, the rule of
’one person - one vote’ does not influence the allocation of the rents.
Starting point for the analysis is the proposal for the reform of decision-making of
the ECB. From all reform options which are introduced in the next section, the ECB
has chosen a rotation scheme for its proposal which the Council of Ministers has
accepted. The classification of the governors into different groups whose members
have a certain number of votes smaller than group members is done according to
the share of aggregated GDP at market prices and the share of the total assets of
the balance sheet of Monetary Financial Institutions (TABS-MFI) the country of
origin of a governor shows. In the third section, other criteria are used such as
the synchronisation of the economic development measured by the correlation with
the average of the monetary union or the dispersion of the economic situation. As
the results indicate, there are some changes in the classification of countries but no
important alteration of the ordering.
The second approach to asses the rotation scheme of the ECB is the calculation
of voting power indices and viewing the change of political influence with a grow-
ing number of members in the Council. The introduction of rotation changes the
political weight once more. As the voting power indices show, the board gains in-
fluence whereas the development of political influence of the national central bank
1Investigations are e.g. the briefing papers for the Committee for Monetary and Economic
Affairs (ECON) of the European Parliament, Belke and Baumga¨rtner 2004, Berger 2002, Berger,
de Haan and Inklaar 2003, Berger and Hefeker 2004, Frenkel and Fendel 2003. The enumeration
has no claim to be complete.
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governors depends partly on the behaviour of the board, e.g. if they are supported
by the board members. With the rotation scheme, the difference between economic
and political weight is not much reduced as the comparison of voting power indices
in the status quo and an enlarged decision-making body shows. The last section
concludes.
2 The Reform of the Decision-Making Procedure
of the ECB
2.1 The Necessity of the Reform and Reform Options
The likely joining of countries to the EMU in the future, decision-making of the
Governing Council of the ECB will be much more complex after new members have
acceded the monetary union. The need for a reform can be summarised by two
points (Hefeker 2002): First, with a growing number of members, the efficiency
of decision-making will be influenced in two dimensions. The speaking time will
increase significantly and prolong meeting time considerably. The decisions itself will
be more complex because more governors have to agree to a proposal independently
of the decision rule, e.g. if a consensus or majority rule will be used. Second,
there is a wedge between the political and economic weight of the countries. If
the principle of ’one person - one vote’ is maintained, this would lead to an over-
representation of smaller countries with respect to their economic weight. This
over-representation seems problematic because of systematic differences between the
economic conditions in small and large countries assuming that the governors decide
with an eye on the economic situation in their country of origin (Heisenberg 2003).
Heinemann and Hu¨fner (2004) find empirical support for the hypothesis that regional
divergences influence the decisions of the ECB Council on the interest rate. Of
special interest in this respect are the board votes. Because it is overall assumed
that the board decides with respect to euro area conditions, an increased relative
weight of the board votes could help to mitigate the difference between political and
economic weight of the nations. On the other hand, over- and under-representation
of countries with regard to voting rights could be in line with unemployment and
wage setting (Berger and Hefeker 2004).
To solve these two problems, four reform options are analysed in the literature.
Because they are investigated in length e.g. in Berger (2002) or Baldwin et al.
(2001), we restrict ourselves to a short overview.
The first solution is the centralisation of decision-making by delegating monetary
policy to the board or a group of selected experts. In contrast to the national central
bank presidents who are undoubtedly experts in monetary policy the connection
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between country of origin and seat in the Council is not that strong. This would
solve both of the above-mentioned problems: the number of members could be
restricted and the members share a similar view on monetary policy in the euro
area. Therefore, the members could be few and decision-making should be fast.
Furthermore, the guideline of ’one person - one vote’ is preserved.
But there are some disadvantages too: Even the composition of the board is not free
of national interests as the discussions about the appointment of new board mem-
bers show. Furthermore, national representatives in the Council supply a broad
view of the economic situation in the euro area and diversified information for the
decisions. Therefore, delegation does not necessarily prevent information providing
by national central bank governors (Baldwin, Berglo¨f, Giavazzi, and Widgre´n 2001).
But the efficiency of this depends on the procedure, e.g. if the governors have the
right to speak in the meeting or write briefing papers. Another problem is that the
independence of the central bank is better served by a diversified appointment pro-
cess absorbing preference shocks of the governments. The Council will be composed
of governors which are appointed by governments with different preferences leading
to a mix of more or less inflation averse members.
The second proposal is to weigh the votes according to some prescribed scheme.
A weighted voting can reduce the wedge between political and economic weight of
the member states but contradicts the principle of ’one person - one vote’. Hefeker
(2002) demands a weighting with regard to population size for the sake of democracy.
This does also encompass the possibility to qualify the decision rule by incorporating
the need that the votes represent the majority of the people in the EMU (Berger,
de Haan, and Inklaar 2003). Nevertheless, the weighting scheme has to be decided.
Representations is the third approach. With representation a group of governors
obtains representative votes. The vote allocation can be done by determining the
voting rights per group or by delegating the voting right of every group member.
The last possibility preserves the ’one person - one vote’ principle. This alternative
demands group selection and fixing the number of groups. One special form would be
extending the competence of regional central banks across national borders (Berger,
de Haan, and Inklaar 2003).
The last proposal is to rotate the voting rights of the decision makers. With rotation,
the governors lose their permanent voting right. The formal criteria defining the
rotation process are the voting periods and the number of group members. Rotation
can be done in a symmetric or asymmetric way. The last-mentioned possibility
also involves a grouping of the members, where the grouping criteria have to be
determined in addition to the rotation scheme. The criteria could be the GDP
share, the synchronisation of the business cycle and/or structural inflation (Berger,
de Haan, and Inklaar 2003) or the population share. If rotation is bound to the
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economic weight of a country, this could solve for efficient decision-making and the
difference between economic and political weight. Furthermore, the whole currency
area should be represented as far as possible. A drawback of the grouping could be,
that the same economic size of their countries of origin does not necessarily mean
that the decision-makers have the same preferences or that the needs of the countries
with regard to monetary policy are similar (Hefeker 2002).
Summing up, some of the solutions seem problematic with respect to political fea-
sibility and legitimacy besides the difficulties determining weights or groups: Rota-
tion and delegation reduce the credibility and accountability of the ECB (Baldwin,
Berglo¨f, Giavazzi, and Widgre´n 2001, p. 45). If members of the Governing Coun-
cil are excluded from the decision (process) the democratic legitimacy is reduced
(Heisenberg 2003). This is because all member countries are affected by the de-
cisions of a selection of the member states. Here a problem of insiders (members
with voting right) and outsiders (members without temporary voting rights) arises
(Waldner, Kocher, and Sutter 2003). Furthermore, delegation and rotation need
high transparency or the assurance that the remaining decision makers are not prone
to national interests. If this could not be supported, Heisenberg (2003) sees repre-
sentation as more democratic especially if grouping is homogenous. For a summary
of pros and cons of different reform options see also Farvaque and Stanek (2003).
2.2 Reform Realisation
The reform option accepted by the Council of Ministers for the solution of a rising
number of representatives in the ECB Governing Council is asymmetric rotation.
The decision of the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of State or
Government of 21 March 2003 on an amendment to Article 10.2 of the Statute of the
European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank is as follows:
The principle of ’one person - one vote’ is kept up but the number of governors with
voting rights will be restrained. This will be implemented via a rotation scheme.
The rotation happens within two and, later on, three groups depending on the total
number of national bank governors. The groups are formed according to a ranking
relying on the share of the aggregated gross domestic product at market prices
and the total aggregated balance sheet of the monetary financial institutions of the
national central bank’s member state which have adopted the euro. The weights
assigned are 5/6 and 1/6, respectively. The groups formed by the Council members
are assigned to the following voting rights (see Table 1). The rule for decision-
making has not changed. The Governing Council acts by simple majority of the
members having a voting right. In the event of a tie, the President has the casting
vote. Decisions can be taken if two third of the Council members are present.
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Table 1: Voting rights of the groups.
total number of governors n 18 < n < 22 n ≥ 22
group I II I II III
number of governors 5 n-5 5 n/2 n-n/2-5
number of voting rights 4 11 4 8 3
This solution has been criticised extensively in the briefing papers of the monetary
dialog with the European Parliament (see Bofinger 2003, de la Dehesa 2003, Gros
2003, Horn 2003, Wyplosz 2003), not least because of the secrecy of the process
leading to the proposal of the reform. The main critique is that most of the cri-
teria the ECB lists to assess the reform (improve the capacity for decision-making,
one member - one vote, ad personam participation, representativeness, robustness,
automaticity and transparency), are missed. Furthermore, the proposal does not
specify the rotation rules and frequencies within a group which could cause further
discussion (Frenkel and Fendel 2003). It says that (Council 2003): ”The frequency
of voting rights of the governors allocated to the first group shall not be lower than
the frequency of voting rights of those of the second group” and ”within each group,
the governors shall have their voting rights for equal amounts of time”. Moreover,
the time of voting rights within one group and the terms of office of a governor can
be incompatible.
But compared to different rotation schemes, the actual solution is not that bad with
respect to difference between economic and political weight (Berger, de Haan, and
Inklaar 2003). In the following, we extend the analysis done so far by comparing
different methods of group selection by economic criteria and use voting power
indices as a second approach.
3 Grouping of Governors and Voting Power in an
Enlarged ECB Council
3.1 Economic Development and Voting Weights
Most of the investigations of the proposal use the intertemporal voting shares to
evaluate the reform, see e.g. Belke and Baumga¨rtner (2004).2 The intertemporal
voting share is given by the share with which a governor participates on the decisions.
2One possibility is to treat this as a problem of insider and outsider. Another possibility is
the question if rotation harms cooperation within a group and treat the decisions as the same
as the provision of a public good with self-interest and common interest (Waldner, Kocher, and
Sutter 2003).
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For a governor of the first group, this number is 4/5. If rotation takes place, the
relative voting weight is calculated as the intertemporal voting share times the voting
weight of 1/n with n the total number of votes. The president has two votes because
he decides in case of a tie, every other Council member has one vote.
As Figure 1 shows, a country’s population share does not necessarily match with
its relative voting weight. The same is true for its economic weight, see Figure 2.
The economic weight is calculated following the ECB proposal (5/6 times the share
of the aggregated GDP at market prices plus 1/6 time the share of TABS-MFI for
2003). The data are summarised in the appendix (see Table 11) and reproduce the
ordering results from e.g. Gros (2003).
The ”big” countries are under-represented and the ”small” countries have a higher
political weight than their relative population size or economic weight would suggest.
The under-representation is more pronounced than the over-representation. There
are some slight differences between the representation with regard to the population
and to the economic weight.
First, we concentrate on the population weight (See Figure 1). Countries which
are member of all four monetary unions have the highest gap in the EMU with 12
member states (EMU-12). With the transition to 15 member states (EMU-15), the
number of members rises. This leads to a lower voting weight as well as a lower
population share. Because the population share decreases more than the voting
weight, gaps are invariably smaller than before. The same picture arises for the
monetary unions where the rotation scheme is applied, the EMU with 22 (EMU-
22) and 25 (EMU-25) member states. For governors belonging to the second and
third group, the gap between voting weight and size of the population is attenuated
for the transition from the status quo voting process to the rotation scheme. For
governors of the first group (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), the wedge between
population share and voting weight rises with the transition to the rotation scheme
because the composition of the union changes. The population share of the countries
rises because the UK with a high share is part of the EMU-15 but not the EMU-
22. At the same time, the voting weight decreases because of a higher number of
voters. This leads to a worsening of the proportion of the population share and
voting weight.
Second, the gap between the voting weight and the economic weight is viewed (see
Figure 2). The pattern of the changing difference between voting and economic
weight is almost the same. The most outstanding difference is that for four governors
of the first group (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) the gap does not only rise for
the transition from the EMU-15 to the EMU-22 but is higher than in the status
quo. Furthermore, the wedge for the EMU-25 is higher than in the EMU-15. The
difference in the scenarios arises because the economic weight of the ten new member
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states is higher than their population share. Therefore, the economic weight is more
reduced than the population share of the old member states with the enlargement
of the EMU.
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Figure 1: The difference between the voting weight and the population share.
There is a drawback assessing the size of a country in this way. The numbers show
the situation in 2003 but to the time of enlarging the EMU the economic situation
of the accession countries could be different. But the GDP as well as the TABS-
MFI will not be as high as in the larger EU countries because of size restrictions.
Furthermore, the reform only accounts for the size of a country and, therefore, has
a focus on representation. If the interest rate decisions of the Governing Council are
regarded, not only the size but the economic situation and its further development
matter, e.g. inflation and output gap or output growth would play a role in the
decision-making as indicated by the basic Taylor rule (Taylor 1993). Other scenarios
are imaginable such as the deviation from the EMU average and the synchronisation
of the economic development. These will by analysed in the next two paragraphs.
Deviation from the EMU average One possibility is to change the grouping
criteria from GDP share and size of the banking sector to GDP growth and inflation.
Inflation is used because a central bank decides about interest rate changes with
regard to the inflation rate. The second component used is economic growth. First,
economic growth or the output gap hint to future inflation pressure. Second, if
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Figure 2: The difference between the voting weight and the economic weight.
the business cycles within one group are relatively similar, one can assume that
the governors of this group represent all countries within this group with respect to
monetary policy. A scatter plot for the inflation rate and the GDP growth rate in
2003 is shown in Figure 3.
The picture shows the difference in the economic situation of old and new EU mem-
bers to date. What stands out is that the new EU members are further away from
the origin indicating a situation of high growth rates and high inflation rates. Nev-
ertheless, there are economies of this group with high growth and low inflation, e.g.
Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia. Slovakia is the outlier with nearly nine per cent in-
flation and a growth rate of around four per cent. The countries of the EMU-12
and EMU-15 cluster near the origin with lower growth and lower inflation rates.
Here, even negative growth rates are noticed, e.g. Portugal, the Netherlands, and
Germany.
The countries with high growth rates are prone to the Balassa-Samuelson effect and
presumably are located in a catching up process. This process could be supported
by a lose monetary policy. On the one hand, this is normally seen in contrast to
the ”old” member states with low inflation rates and a more restrictive monetary
policy. On the other hand, one could ask the question whether the economies of the
old members would overcome slow growth with a more expansive monetary policy.
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Figure 3: Scatter plot for inflation and GDP growth in 2003 (for abbreviations see
appendix). Source: Eurostat Structural Indicators: the growth rate of GDP at constant
prices (base year 1995) - percentage change on previous year and the annual average rate
of change in Harmonised Indices of Consumer Prices for 2003.
But because the main goal of the ECB is securing price stability in the average,
country specific developments only matter if they influence the European average
in a significant way.
To assess whether the economic situation in a country represents the EMU av-
erage we calculate the share a country has in the total deviation of the average
economic situation. The numbers show the dispersion of the economic situation
in the monetary union. The economic situation is approximated by an index, es,
composed as the average between the inflation rate, pi, and the GDP growth rate,
gy, es = (pi+gy)/2. For the calculation of the country-specific share of the deviation
from the European average see appendix (page 27). It shows for how much a country
accounts for the dispersion of growth and inflation in per cent.
If we use the relative deviation from the EMU average for grouping of the governors,
the composition of the groups changes as shown in Table 2. Countries which account
for a small share of the deviation are core countries and are placed in the first
group with the highest voting weight. Using the deviation from the average for
classification does not count for the size of the country but for the similarity of the
economic situation. This makes sense if the national bank governors look at the
economic situation in their country of origin when deciding about the interest rate.
But even if this is not the case, this kind of scheme has its merits: The core group
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of governors have the highest voting weight and represent the economic situation of
the EMU because the countries are near the European average.
Applying the alternative classification scheme leads for half of the governors to a
change of the group. The biggest change is for Malta from the third to the first group
which leads to a significant rise of voting weight. Additionally, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Cyprus and Estonia are better off in the EMU-22 and the Czech Republic,
Cyprus, Finland and Malta in the EMU-25. Worse off are Germany, Greece, the
Netherlands, Spain, Hungary and Slovakia in the EMU-22 and the same countries
and UK but not the Netherlands and Slovakia in the EMU-25. All in all, some
smaller countries change into a group with higher voting weight. Nevertheless, the
governors of the third group come from the new EU members as proposed in the
rotation scheme of the ECB. Greece as the latest member of the monetary union is
part of this group too.
A direct comparison with the voting weight is not possible because a high share
from the deviation means less representation in economic terms and the governor
of this country should obtain a low voting weight. Again, only the actual economic
situation is considered, not the possible development of the situation. This analysis
gives only a snap-shot of the economic situation. Furthermore, it is possible, that
the economic situation will converge within a sufficient period of time. Then the
distinguishing feature of inflation and growth loses its significance.
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Synchronisation of economic development Another approach to classify the
countries would be the synchronisation of the economic development. We analyse the
correlation between the economic situation in a country and the average economic
situation of the respective monetary union. The economic situation is captured
by an index, (pi + y)/2, calculated as the average of the inflation rate based on the
Harmonised Consumer Price Index3 and the deviation of industrial production4 from
its trend. The latter is calculated by y = 1 + (ip − ip∗)/ip∗, where ip is the actual
index of seasonal adjusted industrial production and ip∗ the series of the Hodrick-
Prescott filtered industrial production series. This extends the analysis of Berger et
al. (2003) by including the inflation rate into the description of the correlation and
combines that of Hefeker (2002) into one index. We could not include Malta because
no information on monthly industrial production series was available to us. We use
two kinds of EMU averages, the unweighted average and the weighted average. The
weights for the calculation of the EMU inflation rate are determined by the country-
specific share of the total household final monetary consumption expenditure. This
is the weighting scheme Eurostat uses for the calculation of the HICP. For the series
of the industrial production index, also the weighting scheme of Eurostat is used
(Eurostat 2004c). The correlation coefficients between the averages of the EMU-
22 or EMU-25 and the country-specific series of the index for the common sample
(1999:1 - 2003:12) are given in Table 3.
If the correlations are examined, the results depend to a great extend on the rever-
ence index. If the correlation with the unweighted average is considered where every
country gets equal weight, the new EU countries show a strong relationship with the
average. The picture is nearly reversed, if the correlation with the weighted index
is considered. The latter is more appropriate because this will be the situation the
Governing Council is confronted with in an enlarged monetary union. The weighted
averages are the euro-wide variables which are the basis for the decisions about the
next change of the interest rate. In this case, the new EU countries exhibit a rather
low correlation. If we do not change the group size and assume that the group
with the highest voting weight should be composed of countries which are closest to
the average economic development of the euro area, the classification of countries is
given by
- Group I:
EMU-22/EMU-25: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany
3Source: Eurostat, short-term indicators
4Industrial production series: seasonally adjusted, index (2000=100), excluding construction,
Source: Eurostat, short-term indicators.
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Table 3: Correlation with the European average.
EMU-25 EMU-22
correlation with correlation with correlation with correlation with
the weighted average the average the weighted average the average
Germany 0.91 Finland 0.93 Austria 0.93 Finland 0.92
Austria 0.90 Slovenia 0.91 Germany 0.90 Slovenia 0.90
France 0.83 Belgium 0.84 Finland 0.83 Czech Rep. 0.84
Finland 0.77 Czech Rep. 0.83 France 0.80 Belgium 0.83
Belgium 0.73 Austria 0.74 Belgium 0.77 Poland 0.74
Sweden 0.72 Germany 0.72 Ireland 0.77 Austria 0.71
Ireland 0.71 Poland 0.71 Slovenia 0.76 Germany 0.69
Slovenia 0.70 Estonia 0.67 Luxembourg 0.73 Hungary 0.67
Luxembourg 0.69 Hungary 0.64 Spain 0.68 Estonia 0.67
Italy 0.67 Luxembourg 0.64 Italy 0.67 Luxembourg 0.62
Spain 0.66 Denmark 0.61 Greece 0.59 Ireland 0.55
Greece 0.64 Ireland 0.58 Netherlands 0.57 Lithuania 0.51
Netherlands 0.60 Lithuania 0.51 Portugal 0.56 Slovakia 0.41
Portugal 0.60 Slovakia 0.39 Estonia 0.55 Cyprus 0.32
Estonia 0.53 Netherlands 0.35 Czech Rep. 0.53 Netherlands 0.31
Denmark 0.49 Spain 0.33 Cyprus 0.41 Spain 0.31
Czech Rep. 0.48 France 0.33 Lithuania 0.23 France 0.29
Cyprus 0.36 Cyprus 0.33 Latvia 0.19 Latvia 0.22
Latvia 0.22 Sweden 0.25 Poland 0.15 Italy 0.19
Lithuania 0.22 Latvia 0.23 Hungary 0.10 Portugal 0.15
Poland 0.06 Italy 0.22 Slovakia -0.07 Greece 0.07
UK 0.05 Portugal 0.18
Hungary 0.04 Greece 0.12
Slovakia -0.13 UK -0.34
- Group II:
EMU-22: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain
EMU-25: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden
- Group III:
EMU-22: Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia
EMU-25: Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, UK
With this classification scheme it is not only the ”big” countries who receive a
seat in the first group. This is due to the fact that voting power is now primarily
determined by proximity to the average of the monetary union rather than by the
size of the country. By reason of the similar economic conditions in these countries,
the governors should have the same interest in the decision-making process regarding
14
the interest rate. Therefore, it should not matter much besides representation of
the population which governor makes the decision. Even representation should not
be a big problem, because the people in the countries of one group should have the
same interest with respect to monetary policy.
The difference between the correlation coefficient and the intertemporal voting share
is shown in Figure 4 and 5. As a comparison with the original grouping scheme shows
there arises a different pattern for the gap between voting weight and economic
weight, the latter now represented by the correlation coefficient. Now, there are
countries in the first and in the second group which are under- as well as over-
represented if the correlation with the average is the standard. Still, the governors
in the third group have a higher voting share than the economic weight suggests. If
the governors should represent the average economic situation in the euro area, the
correlation with this average seems an appropriate measure. But a note of caution is
in order: The sample of five years is definitely too short to address a whole business
cycle and, therefore, this result has a very preliminary character.
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Figure 4: Difference between the intertemporal voting share and the correlation coeffi-
cient with the average for the EMU-22.
As the analysis of the deviations and the correlations show, the classification of the
member states according to different economic indices gives different results. There
is no possibility to decide which classification scheme is best because the indices
measure the economic situation in different ways. Each scheme may have its justifi-
cations because they pursue individually distinctive goals, e.g. representation of the
relative population size or representation of similarities in the economic situation
and the preferences of the population. To assess the effects of the rotation scheme
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cient with the average for the EMU-25.
better, we go beyond the analysis of voting weights connected to economic weight
and apply voting power indices.
3.2 Voting power
3.2.1 Change of Voting Power due to Enlargement and Rotation
The second part in evaluating the ECB reform is characterised by the use of voting
power indices. The voting weight of a governor could be used to measure the differ-
ence between the economic or population weight and the weight a governor has in
the voting process in an approximate way. But to investigate the power a governor
has on the decisions of the central bank a priori, voting power indices are a better
choice because they account for the distribution of voting weights and, therefore,
power in the different scenarios. As the analysis shows, the average voting power
and the intertemporal voting weight are very similar.
There are different indices to measure voting power. The most common indices
are the Shapley-Shubik index (Shapley and Shubik 1954) and the Banzhaf in-
dex/measure (Banzhaf 1965) and their extensions and refinements 5. Where the
Banzhaf measure indicates the absolute power of influence on the results of a vote,
the Banzhaf index measures the relative share of total power a governor possesses.
Both indices rely on the concept of the pivotal voter. A voter is pivotal in case of the
5See Felsenthal and Machover (1998) for an encompassing analysis of voting power indices.
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Shapley-Shubik index if her agreement turns the coalition from a loser into a winner.
For the Banzhaf index a voter is pivotal if a change of the vote makes the turn from
a winning to a losing coalition. The interpretation of the indices can also follow a
different line of reasoning, the assumption with regard to the probability distribu-
tion of approval (Straffin Jr. 1994, p. 1137): If the voters behave independent of
each other, the power is best measured by the Banzhaf index. If the probability
that the voters agree to a proposal is the same for all, the individual effect can be
assessed by the Shapley-Shubik index (homogeneity assumption).
We concentrate on decisions pertaining to interest rate changes. If interest rate
decisions are taken, the Banzhaf-Index seems to be appropriate, because we want
to investigate if a governor is critical for the agreement about the next interest rate
step (Fedeli and Forte 2001, p. 13). On the other hand, Brueckner (2001) argues
that the Shapley-Shubik index is more appropriate. This is the case if the members
of the Council agree on a proposal with the same probability because the countries
are highly integrated. Furthermore, a voter is powerful if its leaving the coalition
leads to a failure of the proposal. We calculate both indices to asses the voting
power with regard to two different situations where the Governing Council decides.
In the following, we investigate whether voting weight and voting power differ, in
which respect, and the effects of the ECB reform on representation. That is, we
do not change the rotation scheme but calculate the indices for the rotation as it
will be implemented according to the decision of the Council of Ministers.6 To
assess the voting power of the Council members, it is important to account for the
possibility that the board member could support a governor if an interest rate change
is decided. Therefore, the crucial difference between the scenarios is the behaviour
of the board. The first possibility is to assume that the board only cares about the
EMU average. The second possibility is to presume that the board members behave
as national agents and support the decision of the national central bank governor if
she originates from the country that the board member represents. In this case, the
votes of a national central bank governor are assumed to add up from that of the
governor and that of the board member. Of course, not every board member will
support the governor of her country of origin. It is imaginable that only a part of
the board members behave as national partisans.
The most interesting case is that of a Council with partisan board members and
rotation. The president and the board members have to decide if they should behave
as partisan. But they cannot influence to which group the governor of their country
of origin belongs to and, therefore, not on the voting weight they get allocated.
These coalitions of board member/president and governor generate different voting
power indices for the national governors depending on the number of board members
6For an investigation regarding alternative rotation schemes see Berger et al. (2002) or Baldwin
et al. (2001).
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supporting a governor and the distribution of the votes on the different groups. To
assess the development of voting power, we calculate the average voting power for
a member of the Governing Council representing one country with rotation and
partisan board members.
The following scenarios are limited to the status quo (EMU-12) and the enlargement
of the monetary union by 10 member (EMU-22).
A Status quo: 12 governors and six board members.
A1: EMU-12 without rotation, non-partisan board members.
A2: EMU-12 without rotation and partisan board members.
B Enlargement by 10 governors without rotation: 22 governors and six board
members.
B1: EMU-22 without rotation, non-partisan board members.
B2: EMU-22 without rotation and partisan board members.
C Enlargement by 10 governors with rotation: 22 governors and six board mem-
bers.
C1: EMU-22 with rotation, non-partisan board members.
C2: EMU-22 with rotation and partisan board members.
In the status quo, no rotation is intended and, therefore, the scenarios contain only
the distinction between partisan board members and non-partisan board member
(scenario A). If the board members behave as national partisans, they vote in line
with the governor of their country of origin (scenario A2). That is the same as if
the members of the Governing Council are reduced, but the respective governors
have a higher voting weight. No governor will be supported by more than one board
member because the board member will assist the governor of her country of origin.
In scenario A1, the board members make their own decisions without connection to
their country of origin. The next collection of scenarios is given by situations where
the Council is enlarged by ten new governors but rotation is not applied. Again, the
board members could behave as partisans (B2) or not (B1). The last both scenarios
are that for an enlarged decision-making body and rotation takes place (scenario C).
If the board members support the decisions of the national governors, the voting
power depends on the group in which the governor is placed (scenario C2).
We assume that the decisions of the Governing Council are made with simple ma-
jority as prescribed in the statute. Because of the growing number of members it
18
seems not unreasonable to assume that the decision rule of simple majority will
play a larger role because unanimity is harder to achieve in a larger decision-making
body.
The weighting of the votes in case of rotation is done by the intertemporal voting
share. The president of the central bank gets double weight of a board member
because he decides in case of a tie. The threshold is determined by simple majority,
that is in case of the EMU-12 ten votes, in case of the EMU-22 15 votes without
rotation and 11 votes with rotation.
Because the results for the normalised Banzhaf index and the Shapley-Shubik index
are nearly identical (see appendix), we show only the Banzhaf index/normalised
Banzhaf index and the Banzhaf measure/non-normalised Banzhaf index for inter-
pretation (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, p. 39). Even if the Banzhaf index and
the Shapley-Shubik index have similar values, the interpretation is different. The
Banzhaf index indicates the power of policy-seeking and the Shapley-Shubik index
that of office-seeking (Felsenthal and Machover 1998, p. 18).
In the following, the change of voting power is analysed for the national central
bank governors and the board. We compare the status quo of a monetary union
of 12 countries with an enlarged monetary union where ten new governors join
the Council. To assess the effect of the rotation scheme, the voting power of the
Council members is also calculated for the EMU-22 but without rotation. All three
basic scenarios are considered for non-partisan (see appendix Table 5, 6, and 9) and
partisan board members (see appendix Table 7, 8, and 10).
A comparison between the voting power and the voting weight for the different
scenarios leads to varying results (see Figure 6 - 9). For scenarios where only one
distribution of voting weights is possible, e.g. if the board members do not support
the national central bank governors, voting weight and voting power are more or less
identical for the three basic scenarios, at least for the Banzhaf index. In this case,
every Council members loses voting power if more members join the decision-making
body. With the introduction of the rotation scheme, the voting weight/power de-
velops different for the Council members. The president as well as the other board
members regain voting power to a relatively large extent. The governors of the first
group also have higher indices in the EMU with rotation than without. But the gain
is small. Governors of the second and third group lose power if the rotation scheme
is introduced. This effect is particularly strong for governors of the third group.
If the board members behave as national partisans, there is a difference in the level of
voting power compared to the non-partisan scenario. The Banzhaf index measures
a higher power for every member of the Governing Council. Moreover, governors of
the first group regain voting power to a larger scope than in case of a non-partisan
board. For governors of the second group the support by board members leads to
19
a gain of voting power after the introduction of rotation. Without support, they
lose power. Even the governors of the third group are better off with rotation
because their loss of voting power is not as attenuated as in the former case. If the
development of voting power and voting weight is compared, the similar change of
both measures as seen in the non-partisan scenario is broken. This is evident in case
of the voting power of governors of the second group which rises, whereas the voting
weight indicates a loss of political weight.
The Banzhaf index indicates a drop of relative power for the president and the other
board members. But as the Banzhaf measure indicates, every board member includ-
ing the president are a priori more able to tip the balance in the decisions in case of
rotation than under the present decision-making process. This is the case whether
they behave as national partisans or not. The a priori voting power of governors of
the third group is reduced if the Council is enlarged and this development continues
if the rotation scheme is introduced.
This is the same pattern as the relative voting power shows. For the first group of
governors, there is no significant difference in the behaviour of the relative and the
a priori power. But for the governors of the second group, there is no recovering
of power with the introduction of the rotation as in the case of the relative voting
power. Not surprisingly, the Banzhaf measure also leads to a higher level of voting
power than the normalised Banzhaf index for every member of the Council.
The small difference between the development of the voting power indices and the
voting weight with the enlargement of the Council can be attributed to the averaging
over the different values of the voting power indices in case of a partisan board.
Where the voting weight can only account for the basic case, the voting power
indices differentiate between varying constellations of partisan board members and
account for the variance of voting power.
The high voting power of the board, especially of the president, could be seen as a
concession for an expert committee deciding about monetary policy. If the board
only decides with respect to the necessities of the monetary union as a whole whereas
the national central bank governors are seen as pursuing national interests to a
certain extent, the fortification of the board protects monetary policy against the
influence of national interests.
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Figure 6: Voting weight and voting power measured by the normalised Banzhaf index in
the EMU-12 (A1), EMU-22 without rotation (B1) and EMU-22 with rotation (C1) and
non-partisan board members.
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Figure 7: Voting weight and voting power measured by the non-normalised Banzhaf
index in the EMU-12 (A1), EMU-22 without rotation (B1) and EMU-22 with rotation
(C1) and non-partisan board members.
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Figure 8: Voting weight and voting power measured by the normalised Banzhaf index in
the EMU-12 (A2), EMU-22 without rotation (B2) and EMU-22 with rotation (C2) and
partisan board members.
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Figure 9: Voting weight and voting power measured by the non-normalised Banzhaf
index in the EMU-12 (A2), EMU-22 without rotation (B2) and EMU-22 with rotation
(C2) and partisan board members.
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Summing up, the introduction of the rotation scheme in the enlarged monetary union
leads to losses of voting power for the governors in group III. For the governors of
the other two groups, the development of voting power for the different scenarios
depends on the assumption about the behaviour of the board. If the board members
support the national central bank governors, their voting power increases compared
to an enlarged decision-making body without rotation. Furthermore, if there are
national partisan board members, the level of voting power of the Council members
increases in every case. The latter fact suggests, that it is not unreasonable to expect
that the board could behave partisan.
Besides the efficiency of the decision-making process, the deviation of economic and
political weight is one reason for the reform. If the political and economic weight
are identical, it does not matter for the results of the interest rate decision if the
governors are influenced by the economic situation in their country of origin: The
interest rate of the euro area resulting from the decisions of the ECB Council is a
weighted average of the interest rates preferred by the governments and the board
i∗bd, where the weighting is done according to the parameter a and 1− a, 0 ≤ a ≤ 1,
indicating the relative political power of board and national central bank governors
as a whole. The interest rates the governors pursue, i∗i , are aggregated with the help
of the respective individual political weight of a governor in the decision process,
bi. Therefore, we can write the interest rate of the euro area as the outcome of the
Council decisions as follows:
i∗ = a
∑
i
bii
∗
i + (1− a)i∗board.
Furthermore, we assume that the governors and the board decide about the interest
rate according to a Taylor rule and determine the interest rates by the following
equations, where the governors look at country-specific as well as euro area variables
and the board on euro area variables only:
i∗i = ci(αi + βipii + γiy¯i) + (1− ci)(αi + βipi + γiy¯)
i∗bd = αbd + βbdpi + γbdy¯.
The Taylor interest rate depends on the inflation rate pi and the output gap y¯. The
coefficients of the inflations rates and output gaps incorporate the preferences of the
central banker regarding the inflation and the output gap. The weight a governor
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assigns to the country-specific variables is denoted by ci. This leads to an equation
for the euro area interest rate of
i∗ = a
∑
i
bi[ci(αi + βipii + γiy¯i) + (1− ci)(αi + βipi + γiy¯)]
+(1− a)(αbd + βbdpi + γbdy¯)
= a
∑
i
biαi + a
∑
i
biβicipii + a
∑
i
biγiciy¯i + pia
∑
i
biβi(1− ci)
+y¯a
∑
i
biγi(1− ci) + (1− a)(αbd + βbdpi + γbdy¯).
Furthermore, we assume that a governor does not react different to the inflation rate
of the euro area and the country-specific value and the same for the output gap.
The difference between the decision makers is given by the variables they look at.
The political weight reflects the influence the country-specific variables exert on
the preferred interest rate, abiβici, and the political weights sum up to one with
a
∑
biβici = 1. If the political and the economic weight is identical, then
a
∑
biβicipii = pi and a
∑
biγiciy¯i = y¯ and the equation for the Taylor interest
rate of the euro area simplifies as follows
i∗ = a
∑
biαi + (1− a)αbd +
[
a
∑
biβi + (1− a)βbd
]
pi
+
[
a
∑
biγi + (1− a)γbd
]
y¯.
In this case, the interest rate of the euro area depends only on aggregated variables,
regardless how much weight the Council members assign to the euro area or country-
specific variables.
A comparison of the economic and population weight with the voting power as
an approximation for the political weight can only be done for the Banzhaf and
Shapley-Shubik index because these indices sum up to one just as the the economic
and population shares do. In addition, the classification of governors into groups
leads to a generalisation because all members of a group get the same voting power
even if their economic and population weights differ. We compare the average of the
population weight and the average of the economic weight of the different groups
with the respective Banzhaf index (see Figure 10 and 11). Thereby, the statements
are the same for the economic and the population weight.
24
-13
-11
-9
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
economic
weight
population
weight
economic
weight
population
weight
economic
weight
population
weight
Group I Group II Group III
i n
 p
e
r c
e
n
t a
g
 p
o
i n
t s
A1 - EMU-12 B1 - EMU-22 without rotation C1 - EMU-22 with rotation
Figure 10: The difference between voting power measured by the Banzhaf index and
average economic and population weight for the EMU-12 (A1), EMU-22 without rotation
(B1) and EMU-22 with rotation (C1) and non-partisan board members.
-12
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
economic
weight
population
weight
economic
weight
population
weight
economic
weight
population
weight
Group I Group II Group III
i n
 p
e
r c
e
n
t a
g
e
 p
o
i n
t s
A1 - EMU-12 B1 - EMU-22 without rotation C1 - EMU-22 with rotation
Figure 11: The difference between voting power measured by the Banzhaf index and
average economic and population weight for the EMU-12 (A2), EMU-22 without rotation
(B2) and EMU-22 with rotation (C2) and partisan board members.
For the governors of group I, the loss of voting power caused by the enlargement
compared to the status quo leads to a worsening of the representation of the coun-
tries with respect to the economic as well as population weight by their governors.
The loss is partly offset by the introduction of the rotation scheme. The loss of
voting power for the governors of group III leads to an adjustment of political and
economic/population weight. This is an advantage in terms of representation. Be-
cause the governors of group II also lose voting power compared to the EMU-12,
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the gap between the economic and population share and the voting power is closed
but not to a large extend and only if there is no partisan behaviour of the board.
All in all, the rotation scheme is only appropriate to a certain extent to account for
the adjustment between economic/population share and political influence on the
interest rate decisions.
4 Conclusion
The reform of the ECB designed to meet the challenges of the enlargement of the
EMU by up to 13 members has been severely criticised. The criticism mostly refers
to the self-imposed goals of the ECB, e.g. representation, transparency, ’one person
- one vote’, and efficiency of the decision process. Especially the economic criteria
for the allocation of national central bank governors into different groups of the
rotation scheme have the reputation of being political motivated. In the paper, we
ask if there would be a significantly different classification of the member states, if
other economic criteria would be used. As the analysis shows, the use of different
economic criteria does not lead to a reversed ordering of the countries compared to
the ECB proposal and, therefore, to a much different allocation of the governors to
the groups. The use of the deviation from the average economic situation would
lead to more changes in the group composition than the use of the synchronisation
of the economic development. But even then, most of the countries would move into
the next higher or lower group. A change from the first to the third group or reverse
would be a rare exception. If the similarity in the economic development is used,
small member states would get a higher weight. But the third group of governors
with the smallest voting weight would predominantly be composed of the new EU
member states as in the accepted reform.
The second approach to evaluate the reform is the use of voting power indices to
trace the development of the political influence of a Council member on interest
rate decisions influenced by the enlargement of the Council and the introduction
of the rotation scheme. As it is shown, the board is the only part of the Council
which unanimously gains because of the introduction of rotation. This could be
interpreted as a movement towards an expert committee if one assumes that the
board members are less prone to influences of national interests. For the national
central bank governors, all votes lose power with the enlargement so that the under-
representation of countries of group I is aggravated but this development is slightly
diminished or at least not amplified by the introduction of the rotation scheme.
For the group III of governors, the over-representation is further reduced by the
introduction of the rotation scheme.
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Appendix
Calculation of the deviations The inflation rate and growth rate of the re-
spective monetary union are determined by a weighted average of the country-
specific series. For the calculation of the EMU average of the inflation rate, the
Eurostat weighting scheme of the year 2004 for the HICP is used because only
this scheme includes the weights for the new member states (Eurostat 2004a and
2004b). The weighting scheme of the growth rate is also the one used by Eurostat
(Eurostat 2004c). Then, the country-specific deviations dei from the respective av-
erage of the monetary union are calculated, dei = |esi−es|. Summing the deviations
and determining the relative share of a country rdei on the aggregated deviation de
gives the relative deviation of a country, rdei = dei/de.
Table 4: Abbreviations
AT Austria SD Sweden
BE Belgium UK United Kingdom
FI Finland CZ Czech Republic
FR France CY Cyprus
DE Germany HU Hungary
EL Greece LV Latvia
IE Ireland LT Lithuania
IT Italy MT Malta
LU Luxembourg SI Slovakia
NL Netherlands SE Slovenia
PT Portugal EE Estonia
ES Spain PO Poland
DK Denmark
Table 5: A1 - Voting power in the EMU-12 with non-partisan board members.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 2 0.3709 0.1111 0.1111
Board member 1 0.1746 0.0523 0.0523
NB governor 1 0.1746 0.0523 0.0523
Number of players 18
Quota 10
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
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Table 6: B1 - Voting power in the EMU-22 with non-partisan board members.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 2 0.2989 0.0714 0.0714
Board member 1 0.1439 0.0344 0.0344
NB governor 1 0.1439 0.0344 0.0344
Number of players 28
Quota 15
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
Table 7: A2 - Average voting power in the EMU-12 with partisan board members.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 2 0.3597 0.1318 0.1327
Board member 1 0.1962 0.0731 0.0732
NB governor 1 0.1773 0.0662 0.0662
Quota 10
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
Table 8: B2 - Average voting power in the EMU-22 with partisan board members.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 2 0.3118 0.0875 0.0877
Board member 1 0.1750 0.0497 0.0499
NB governor 1 0.1562 0.0447 0.0447
Quota 15
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
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Table 9: C1 - Voting power in the EMU-22 with non-partisan board members and rota-
tion.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 20 0.3889 0.0985 0.0976
Board member 10 0.1816 0.0460 0.0463
NB governor group I 8 0.1435 0.0364 0.0364
NB governor group II 7 0.1268 0.0321 0.0321
NB governor group III 5 0.0897 0.0227 0.0226
Number of players 28
Quota 110
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
Table 10: C2 - Average voting power in the EMU-22 with partisan board members and
rotation.
Voting Banzhaf Banzhaf Shapley-
Weight measure index Shubik
index
President 28/27/25/20 0.4013 0.1218 0.1218
Board Member 18/17/15/10 0.2168 0.0638 0.0638
NB Governor group I 28/18/8 0.1663 0.0509 0.0510
NB Governor group II 27/17/7 0.1503 0.0460 0.0460
NB Governor group III 25/15/5 0.1197 0.0366 0.0364
Quota 110
The calculation is done using the algorithm of Tannenbaum (1997) and own modi-
fications.
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